# GSU 1AC

### P Aff – Pakistan Advantage [1/\_\_]

#### Drone strikes are causing instability and terrorist backlash in Pakistan - creating a failed state syndrome and killing relations

Rohde ’12 (David Rohde, American author and investigative journalist for Thomson Reuters. While a reporter for The Christian Science Monitor, he won the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting in 1996 for his coverage of the Srebrenica massacre. From July 2002 until December 2004, he was co-chief of The New York Times' South Asia bureau, based in New Delhi, India. He shared a second Pulitzer Prize for Times 2008 team coverage of Afghanistan and Pakistan, While in Afghanistan, Rohde was kidnapped by members of the Taliban in November 2008, but managed to escape in June 2009 after seven months in captivity, “How Obama’s drone war is backfiring”, <http://blogs.reuters.com/david-rohde/2012/03/01/how-obamas-drone-war-is-backfiring/>, March/April issue of Foreign Policy, March 1, 2012)

When Barack Obama took the oath of office three years ago, no one associated the phrase “targeted killing” with his optimistic young presidency. In his inaugural address, the 47-year-old former constitutional law professor uttered the word “terror” only once. Instead, he promised to use technology to “harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories.” Oddly, technology has enabled Obama to become something few expected: a president who has dramatically expanded the executive branch’s ability to wage high-tech clandestine war. With a determination that has surprised many, Obama has embraced the CIA, expanded its powers and approved more targeted killings than any modern president. Over the last three years, the Obama administration has carried out at least 239 covert drone strikes, more than five times the 44 approved under George W. Bush. And after promising to make counterterrorism operations more transparent and rein in executive power, Obama has arguably done the opposite, maintaining secrecy and expanding presidential authority. Just as importantly, the administration’s excessive use of drone attacks undercuts one of its most laudable policies: a promising new post-9/11 approach to the use of lethal American force, one of multilateralism, transparency and narrow focus. Obama’s willingness to deploy lethal force should have come as no surprise. In a 2002 speech, Illinois State Senator Obama opposed Bush’s impending invasion of Iraq, but not all conflicts. “I don’t oppose all wars,” he said. “What I am opposed to is a dumb war.” And as president, in his December 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, Obama warned, “There will be times when nations — acting individually or in concert — will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.” Since then, he has not only sent U.S. forces into Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, but also repeatedly approved commando raids in Pakistan and Somalia and on the high seas, while presiding over a system that unleashed hundreds of drone strikes. In a series of recent interviews, current and former administration officials outlined what could be called an “Obama doctrine” on the use of force. Obama’s embrace of multilateralism, drone strikes and a light U.S. military presence in Libya, Pakistan and Yemen, they contend, has proved more effective than Bush’s go-heavy approach in Iraq and Afghanistan. “We will use force unilaterally if necessary against direct threats to the United States,” Ben Rhodes, the administration’s deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, told me. “And we’ll use force in a very precise way.” Crises the administration deems indirect threats to the United States — such as the uprisings in Libya and Syria — are “threats to global security,” Rhodes argued, and will be responded to multilaterally and not necessarily by force. The drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the creation of a smaller, more agile U.S. military spread across Asia, the Pacific and the Middle East, are also part of the doctrine. So is the discreet backing of protesters in Egypt, Iran and Syria. The emerging strategy — which Rhodes touted as “a far more focused approach to our adversaries” — is a welcome shift from the martial policies and bellicose rhetoric of both the Bush administration and today’s Republican presidential candidates. But Obama has granted the CIA far too much leeway in carrying out drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. In both countries, the strikes often appear to be backfiring. Obama and other administration officials insist the drones are used rarely and kill few civilians. In a rare public comment on the program, the president defended the strikes in late January. “I want to make sure the people understand, actually, drones have not caused a huge number of civilian casualties,” Obama said. “For the most part, they have been very precise precision strikes against al Qaeda and their affiliates. And we are very careful in terms of how it’s been applied.” But from Pakistan to Yemen to post-American Iraq, drones often spark deep resentment where they operate. When they do attack, they kill as brutally as any weapon of war. The administration’s practice of classifying the strikes as secret only exacerbates local anger and suspicion. Under Obama, drone strikes have become too frequent, too unilateral, and too much associated with the heavy-handed use of American power. In 2008, I saw this firsthand. Two Afghan colleagues and I were kidnapped by the Taliban and held captive in the tribal areas of Pakistan for seven months. From the ground, drones are terrifying weapons that can be heard circling overhead for hours at a time. They are a potent, unnerving symbol of unchecked American power. At the same time, they were clearly effective, killing foreign bomb-makers and preventing Taliban fighters from gathering in large groups. The experience left me convinced that drone strikes should be carried out — but very selectively. In the January interview, Obama insisted drone strikes were used only surgically. “It is important for everybody to understand,” he said, “that this thing is kept on a very tight leash.” Drones, though, are in no way surgical. In interviews, current and former Obama administration officials told me the president and his senior aides had been eager from the outset to differentiate their approach in Pakistan and Afghanistan from Bush’s. Unlike in Iraq, where Democrats thought the Bush administration had been too aggressive, they thought the Bush White House had not been assertive enough with Afghan and Pakistani leaders. So the new administration adopted a unilateral, get-tough approach in South Asia that would eventually spread elsewhere. As candidate Obama vowed in a 2007 speech, referring to Pakistan’s president at the time, “If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won’t act, we will.” In his first year in office, Obama approved two large troop surges in Afghanistan and a vast expansion of the number of CIA operatives in Pakistan. The CIA was also given more leeway in carrying out drone strikes in the country’s ungoverned tribal areas, where foreign and local militants plot attacks for Afghanistan, Pakistan and beyond. The decision reflected both Obama’s belief in the need to move aggressively in Pakistan and the influence of the CIA in the new administration. To a far greater extent than the Bush White House, Obama and his top aides relied on the CIA for its analysis of Pakistan, according to current and former senior administration officials. As a result, preserving the agency’s ability to carry out counterterrorism, or “CT,” operations in Pakistan became of paramount importance. “The most important thing when it came to Pakistan was to be able to carry out drone strikes and nothing else,” said a former official who spoke on condition of anonymity. “The so-called strategic focus of the bilateral relationship was there solely to serve the CT approach.” Initially, the CIA was right. Increased drone strikes in the tribal areas eliminated senior al Qaeda operatives in 2009. Then, in July 2010, Pakistanis working for the CIA pulled up behind a white Suzuki navigating the bustling streets of Peshawar. The car’s driver was later tracked to a large compound in the city of Abbottabad. On May 2, 2011, U.S. commandos killed Osama bin Laden there. The U.S. intelligence presence, though, extended far beyond the hunt for bin Laden, according to former administration officials. At one point, the CIA tried to deploy hundreds of operatives across Pakistan but backed off after suspicious Pakistani officials declined to issue them visas. At the same time, the agency aggressively used the freer hand Obama had given it to launch more drone strikes than ever before. Established by the Bush administration and Musharraf in 2004, the covert CIA drone program initially carried out only “personality” strikes against a preapproved list of senior al Qaeda members. Pakistani officials were notified before many, but not all, attacks. Between 2004 and 2007, nine such attacks were carried out in Pakistan, according to the New America Foundation. In 2008, the Bush administration authorized less-restrictive “signature” strikes in the tribal areas. Instead of basing attacks on intelligence regarding a specific person, CIA drone operators could carry out strikes based on the behavior of people on the ground. Operators could launch a drone strike if they saw a group, for example, crossing back and forth over the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In 2008, the Bush administration carried out 33 strikes. Under Obama, the drone campaign has escalated rapidly. The number of strikes rose steeply to 53 in 2009 and then more than doubled to 118 in 2010. Former administration officials said the looser rules resulted in the killing of more civilians. Current administration officials insisted that Obama, in fact, tightened the rules on the use of drone strikes after taking office. They said strikes rose under Obama because improved technology and intelligence gathering created more opportunities for attacks than existed under Bush. But as Pakistani public anger over the spiraling strikes grew, other diplomats expressed concern as well. The U.S. ambassador in Pakistan at the time, Anne Patterson, opposed several attacks, but the CIA ignored her objections. When Cameron Munter replaced Patterson in October 2010, he objected even more vigorously. On at least two occasions, CIA Director Leon Panetta dismissed Munter’s protests and launched strikes, the Wall Street Journal later reported. One strike occurred only hours after Sen. John Kerry, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had completed a visit to Islamabad. A March 2011 strike brought the debate to the White House. A day after Pakistani officials agreed to release CIA contractor Raymond Davis, the agency — again over Munter’s objections — carried out a signature drone strike that the Pakistanis say killed four Taliban fighters and 38 civilians. Already angry about the Davis case, Pakistan’s Army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, issued an unusual public statement, saying a group of tribal elders had been “carelessly and callously targeted with complete disregard to human life.” U.S. intelligence officials dismissed the Pakistani complaints and insisted 20 militants had perished. “There’s every indication that this was a group of terrorists, not a charity car wash in the Pakistani hinterlands,” one official told the Associated Press.

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Surprised by the vehemence of the official Pakistani reaction, National Security Adviser Tom Donilon questioned whether signature strikes were worthwhile. Critics inside and outside the U.S. government contended that a program that began as a carefully focused effort to kill senior al Qaeda leaders had morphed into a bombing campaign against low-level Taliban fighters. Some outside analysts even argued that the administration had adopted a de facto “kill not capture” policy, given its inability to close Bush’s Guantánamo Bay prison and create a new detention system. In April 2011, the director of Pakistan’s intelligence service, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, visited Washington in an effort to repair the relationship, according to news accounts and former administration officials. Just after his visit, two more drone strikes occurred in the tribal areas, which Pasha took as a personal affront. In a rare concession, Panetta agreed to notify Pakistan’s intelligence service before the United States carried out any strike that could kill more than 20 people. In May, after the bin Laden raid sparked further anger among Pakistani officials, Donilon launched an internal review of how drone strikes were approved, according to a former administration official. But the strikes continued. At the end of May, State Department officials were angered when three missile strikes followed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Pakistan. As Donilon’s review progressed, an intense debate erupted inside the administration over the signature strikes, according to the Wall Street Journal. Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the strikes should be more selective. Robert Gates, then the defense secretary, warned that angry Pakistani officials could cut off supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Clinton warned that too many civilian casualties could strengthen opposition to Pakistan’s weak, pro-American president, Asif Ali Zardari. The CIA countered that Taliban fighters were legitimate targets because they carried out cross-border attacks on U.S. forces, according to the former official. In June, Obama sided with the CIA. Panetta conceded that no drone strike would be carried out when Pakistani officials visited Washington and that Clinton and Munter could object to proposed strikes. But Obama allowed the CIA director to retain final say. Last November, the worst-case scenario that Mullen, Gates and Clinton had warned of came to pass. After NATO airstrikes mistakenly killed 24 Pakistani soldiers on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Kayani [army chief general] demanded an end to all U.S. drone strikes and blocked supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan. At the same time, popular opposition to Zardari soared. After a nearly two-month lull that allowed militants to regroup, drone strikes resumed in the tribal areas this past January. But signature strikes are no longer allowed — for the time being, according to the former senior official. Among average Pakistanis, the strikes played out disastrously. In a 2011 Pew Research Center poll, 97 percent of Pakistani respondents who knew about the attacks said American drone strikes were a “bad thing.” Seventy-three percent of Pakistanis had an unfavorable view of the United States, a 10-percentage-point rise from 2008. Administration officials say the strikes are popular with Pakistanis who live in the tribal areas and have tired of brutal jihadi rule. And they contend that Pakistani government officials — while publicly criticizing the attacks — agree in private that they help combat militancy. Making the strikes more transparent could reduce public anger in other parts of Pakistan, U.S. officials concede. But they say some elements of the Pakistani government continue to request that the strikes remain covert. For me, the bottom line is that both governments’ approaches are failing. Pakistan’s economy is dismal. Its military continues to shelter Taliban fighters it sees as proxies to thwart Indian encroachment in Afghanistan. And the percentage of Pakistanis supporting the use of the Pakistani Army to fight extremists in the tribal areas — the key to eradicating militancy — dropped from a 53 percent majority in 2009 to 37 percent last year. Pakistan is more unstable today than it was when Obama took office. A similar dynamic is creating even worse results on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. Long ignored by the United States, Yemen drew sudden attention after a suicide attack on the USS Cole killed 17 American sailors in the port of Aden in 2000. In 2002, the Bush administration carried out a single drone strike in Yemen that killed Abu Ali al-Harithi, an al Qaeda operative who was a key figure in orchestrating the Cole attack. In the years that followed, the administration shifted its attentions to Iraq, and militants began to regroup. A failed December 2009 attempt by a militant trained in Yemen to detonate a bomb on a Detroit-bound airliner focused Obama’s attention on the country. Over the next two years, the United States carried out an estimated 20 airstrikes in Yemen, most in 2011. In addition to killing al Qaeda-linked militants, the strikes killed dozens of civilians, according to Yemenis. Instead of decimating the organization, the Obama strikes have increased the ranks of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula from 300 fighters in 2009 to more than 1,000 today, according to Gregory Johnsen, a leading Yemen expert at Princeton University. In January, the group briefly seized control of Radda, a town only 100 miles from the capital, Sanaa. “I don’t believe that the U.S. has a Yemen policy,” Johnsen told me. “What the U.S. has is a counterterrorism strategy that it applies to Yemen.” The deaths of bin Laden and many of his lieutenants are a step forward, but Pakistan and Yemen are increasingly unstable. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed country of 180 million with resilient militant networks; Yemen, an impoverished, failing state that is fast becoming a new al Qaeda stronghold. “They think they’ve won because of this approach,” the former administration official said, referring to the administration’s drone-heavy strategy. “A lot of us think there is going to be a lot bigger problems in the future.” The backlash from drone strikes in the countries where they are happening is not the only worry. In the United States, civil liberties and human rights groups are increasingly concerned with the breadth of powers Obama has claimed for the executive branch as he wages a new kind of war. In the Libya conflict, the administration invoked the drones to create a new legal precedent. Under the War Powers Resolution, the president must receive congressional authorization for military operations within 60 days. When the deadline approached in May, the administration announced that because NATO strikes and drones were carrying out the bulk of the missions, no serious threat of U.S. casualties existed and no congressional authorization was needed. “It’s changed the way politicians talk about what should be the most important thing that a nation engages in,” said Peter W. Singer, a Brookings Institution researcher. “It’s changed the way we in the public deliberate war.” Last fall, a series of drone strikes in Yemen set another dangerous precedent, according to civil liberties and human rights groups. Without any public legal proceeding, the U.S. government executed three of its own citizens. On Sept. 30, a drone strike killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a charismatic American-born cleric of Yemeni descent credited with inspiring terrorist attacks around the world. Samir Khan, a Pakistani-American jihadist traveling with him, was killed as well. Several weeks later, another strike killed Awlaki’s 16-year-old son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, also a U.S. citizen. Administration officials insisted a Justice Department review had authorized the killings but declined to release the full document. “The administration has claimed the power to carry out extrajudicial executions of Americans on the basis of evidence that is secret and is never seen by anyone,” said Jameel Jaffer, deputy legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union. “It’s hard to understand how that is consistent with the Constitution.” After criticizing the Bush administration for keeping the details of its surveillance, interrogation and detention practices secret, Obama is doing the same thing. His administration has declined to reveal the details of how it places people on kill lists, carries out eavesdropping in the United States or decides whom to detain overseas. The administration is also prosecuting six former government officials on charges of leaking classified information to the media — more cases than all other administrations combined. Administration officials deny being secretive and insist they have disclosed more information about their counterterrorism practices than the Bush administration, which fiercely resisted releasing details of its “war on terror” and established the covert drone program in Pakistan. Obama administration officials say they have established a more transparent and flexible approach outside Pakistan that involves military raids, drone strikes and other efforts. They told me that every attack in Yemen was approved by Yemeni officials. Eventually, they hope to make drone strikes joint efforts carried out openly with local governments. For now, keeping them covert prevents American courts from reviewing their constitutionality, according to Jaffer. He pointed out that if a Republican president followed such policies, the outcry on the left would be deafening. “You have to remember that this authority is going to be used by the next administration and the next administration after that,” Jaffer said. “You need to make sure there are clear limits on what is really unparalleled power.” To their credit, Obama and his senior officials have successfully reframed Bush’s global battle as a more narrowly focused struggle against al Qaeda. They stopped using the term “war on terror” and instead described a campaign against a single, clearly identifiable group. Senior administration officials cite the toppling of Muammar al-Qaddafi as the prime example of the success of their more focused, multilateral approach to the use of force. At a cost of zero American lives and $1 billion in U.S. funding, the Libya intervention removed an autocrat from power in five months. The occupation of Iraq claimed 4,484 American lives, cost at least $700 billion, and lasted nearly nine years. “The light U.S. footprint had benefits beyond less U.S. lives and resources,” Rhodes told me. “We believe the Libyan revolution is viewed as more legitimate. The U.S. is more welcome. And there is less potential for an insurgency because there aren’t foreign forces present.” In its most ambitious proposal, the administration is also trying to restructure the U.S. military, implement steep spending cuts and “right-size” U.S. forces around the world. Under Obama’s plan, the Army would be trimmed by 80,000 soldiers, some U.S. units would be shifted from the Middle East to the Pacific, and more small, covert bases would be opened. Special Forces units that have been vastly expanded in Iraq and Afghanistan would train indigenous forces and carry out counterterrorism raids. Declaring al Qaeda nearly defeated, administration officials say it is time for a new focus. “Where does the U.S. have a greater interest in 2020?” Rhodes asked. “Is it Asia-Pacific or Yemen? Obviously, the Asia-Pacific region is clearly going to be more important.” Rhodes has a point, but Pakistan and its nuclear weapons — as well as Yemen and its proximity to vital oil reserves and sea lanes — are likely to haunt the United States for years. Retired military officials warn that drones and commando raids are no substitute for the difficult process of helping local leaders marginalize militants. Missile strikes that kill members of al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan and Yemen do not strengthen economies, curb corruption or improve government services. David Barno, a retired lieutenant general who commanded U.S. forces in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, believes hunting down senior terrorists over and over again is not a long-term solution. “How do you get beyond this attrition warfare?” he asked me. “I don’t think we’ve answered that question yet.”

**P Aff – Pakistan Advantage [3/\_\_]**

#### Pakistan collapse causes global nuclear war

Pitt ‘9 (William, a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence.", “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” <http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183>, May 8, 2009)

But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all. Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world. The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself. Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and use d artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spines of those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster. We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

**P Aff – Pakistan Advantage [4/\_\_]**

#### And Pakistan nukes are not secure

Gregory ’11 (Shaun, Director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the University of Bradford, UK, a professor who published widely on nuclear and security issues in Pakistan and advises many governments, their agencies, and international organizations, “Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 4.6, [http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/131002/ichaptersection\_singledocument/aa282522-4971-4513-a7ca-ec3afcd259be/en/Art+2.pdf](http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/131002/ichaptersection_singledocument/aa282522-4971-4513-a7ca-ec3afcd259be/en/Art%2B2.pdf), accessed 10-26-11, June 2011)

Two high-profile attacks by terrorists on highly secure military bases in Pakistan, the first on the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi in October 2009 and the second on the naval aviation base at PNS Mehran near Karachi in May 2011, have renewed international anxiety about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. This article addresses several worrying trends in Pakistan that are coming together to suggest that the safety and security of nuclear weapons materials in Pakistan may very well be compromised at some point in the future. The Growing Challenge of Securing Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal In recent months, a variety of media sources have reported a significant escalation of nuclear weapons production by Pakistan. According to some of these sources, Pakistan has been building between 12 and 15 nuclear weapons a year, effectively doubling the size of its nuclear arsenal during the past three to four years to around 100 nuclear weapons.1 More disconcerting, Pakistan is engaged in a rapid expansion of its fissile material production through two new reactors, the Khushab II, thought to be operating in some form since 2009, and Khushab III, which has been under construction since 2005-2006 and is likely to come on-stream around 2013- 2014. There is further evidence from the respected Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security that a fourth Khushab reactor may also be under early phase construction.2 Intended primarily to offset rival India’s conventional military advantage, the open-ended escalation of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons production explains why Pakistan has led the opposition to the international Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), a treaty which would cap fissile material stockpiles. Aside from the intricate politics of international arms control, the steady rise in the size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal presents the rather more prosaic, though arguably more serious, challenge of ensuring the physical security of an ever increasing number of nuclear assets. This is not a simple matter. Safeguarding 100 weapons is a significantly greater challenge than safeguarding 50 weapons because strategic and operational realities require that those weapons are dispersed and that dispersal locations are adapted to the complex requirements of safely and securely storing nuclear weapons in various degrees of operational readiness.3 As Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal grows in the years ahead, these challenges will multiply. As many as 70,000 people in Pakistan reportedly have access to, or knowledge of, some element of the Pakistani nuclear weapons production, storage, maintenance, and deployment cycle, from those involved in the manufacture of fissile material, through those engaging in nuclear weapons design, assembly and maintenance, to those who transport and safeguard the weapons in storage and would deploy the weapons in crises.4 That number will also rise steadily as the size of the nuclear arsenal grows. This figure is important because of the complex and highly polarized debates about nuclear weapons safety and security in Pakistan. All sides of that debate agree that Pakistan has, with considerable U.S. assistance, put in place a range of robust measures to seek to assure the safety and security of its nuclear weapons. The consensus breaks down, however, on the issue of whether these measures provide adequate safety and security for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The Pakistan Army, which has overall control of the weapons, and Pakistan’s government argue forcefully that they do, although even they have recently moderated their statements of reassurance.5 Critics point to a number of vulnerabilities that place these reassurances in some doubt. These vulnerabilities boil down to three core concerns: a) that the physical security of nuclear weapons—across the weapons cycle—may not be robust enough to withstand determined terrorist assault; b) that among the estimated 70,000 people with access to the nuclear weapons cycle, some may be willing to collude in various ways with terrorists;6 c) that the threat extends beyond terrorists gaining access to complete and viable nuclear weapons, and include the immense political and security implications of terrorists gaining access to fissile material, nuclear weapons components, or penetrating nuclear weapons facilities. A July 2009 article in the CTC Sentinel explained in detail the robust measures Pakistan has established to assure the safety and security of its nuclear weapons. It argued that terrorists have shown themselves able to carry out violent attacks at facilities that were reliably identified as having a nuclear weapons role. These facilities include the military complex at Wah, suspected to be involved in the manufacture of nuclear weapons parts; Kamra, suspected to be the designated base for the dispersal of nuclear assets in a crisis; and Sargodha, suspected to be a storage facility for nuclear delivery systems.7 In none of these cases, however, were the terrorist attacks themselves aimed at penetrating the bases or at seizing nuclear assets; rather, they were mass casualty bomb attacks that took advantage of the fact that Pakistani security personnel were concentrated and relatively static at base entry points as they waited to go through security barriers.8 Some analysts criticized the article, arguing that: a) terrorists in Pakistan had never shown themselves capable of penetrating high security bases; b) that the secrecy of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons sites would ensure that terrorists could not know the locations of the weapons. Within a few months, the validity of both these counterarguments would be seriously undermined when Pakistani militants [infiltrated] ~~penetrated~~ the Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi.

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**P Aff – Pakistan Advantage [5/\_\_]**

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The Attack on Pakistan’s Army Headquarters On October 10, 2009, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi militants staged an audacious attack on the Pakistan Army’s GHQ in Rawalpindi, arguably one of the most secure military complexes in Pakistan, housing within its sprawling campus not only the chief of army staff, but also many of Pakistan’s most senior military commanders, including the director-general of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and the director-general of Strategic Forces Command (SFC)— Pakistan’s two most senior operational nuclear commanders. The modalities of this attack add up to a virtual blueprint for a successful attack on a nuclear weapons facility: - the penetration of layers of security checkpoints, barriers, and obstacles on the approach to the sensitive military site; - the terrorist use of army uniforms and—according to some reports—a military vehicle with appropriate license plates, and forged ID cards, to deceive checkpoint personnel; - the use of a safe house relatively close to the target site for several weeks before the operation to allow the buildup of a detailed intelligence picture; - the use of a “sensitive” map (or maps) of the GHQ to allow detailed operational planning. The use of this map (or maps) point to one of two main possibilities: either that the attack had inside help, or that this kind of sensitive information is poorly controlled by the Pakistan Army/ISI; - use of the kind of weaponry—smallarms, grenades and suicide vests— which allow final tier barrier defenses to be penetrated; - use of tactics that allow final tier barriers to be penetrated: grenades and/ or suicide detonations at entry points which then allow penetration by followup commando-style groups; - use of diversionary tactics: attacking one gate first to draw off and weaken the defenses at a secondary entry point, perhaps closer to the main objective.9 In all, at least 10 terrorists were involved in the operation, with four attacking the first gate, and a further six attacking the second gate. The terrorists gained entry to the complex where they took at least 40 people hostage. It took the Pakistan Army’s elite commandos, the Special Service Group (SSG), more than 20 hours to kill or capture all of the militants and free most of the hostages. Two civilians, seven Pakistani soldiers and five SSG commandos were killed in the raid. In the months that followed the assault, several other disturbing aspects about the attack emerged. Among these was the assertion that intelligence about the attacks had been known to Pakistan’s Punjab government well before October 10 and that this intelligence had even been published in two Pakistani newspapers, The News International and The Daily Jhang, four days before the attack, but had been ignored by the Pakistan Army and ISI.10 It also emerged that the terrorists had, ironically, almost certainly learned their tactics from the SSG, which had trained earlier generations of Pakistani/Kashmiri militants in similar tactics for operations against India. In addition, there was a concerted effort by the Pakistan Army and ISI to manipulate the media reporting of the attacks, forcing several private TV channels temporarily off the air, contradicting or retracting certain details, and seeking to play down the significance of the assault.11 The second set of features of the attack relate to secrecy, and they weaken the argument that Pakistan can ultimately rely on concealment to protect its nuclear assets. The use of “sensitive” maps in the attack, the time and proximity to conduct intelligence gathering, the level of knowledge of details such as uniforms, military plates, and possibly ID cards, point to a high level of terrorist knowledge of sensitive military information and protocols, whether through insider help or not. Furthermore, detailed knowledge of Pakistan’s security force movements and modus operandi has been a consistent feature of terrorist actions in Pakistan for many years, from the repeated assassination attempts against former President Pervez Musharraf, at least one of which included the insider involvement of Pakistani military officers,12 through the targeting of the ISI headquarters and vehicles,13 to the murders of senior military figures.14 Pakistan’s Nuclear Security at Risk In this context, given that nuclear weapons and delivery systems demand construction and other visible physical necessities (such as road widening, unusual levels of security, and bunker construction), and given that the growth of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal will significantly expand the construction of nuclear weapons infrastructure and the number of individuals with nuclearrelated roles, it is simply not possible that the location of all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons can remain unknown to terrorists in perpetuity.15 As evidence of this, on August 28, 2009, the U.S. Federation of American Scientists published the first open source satellite imagery of a suspected Pakistani nuclear weapons storage facility near Masroor airbase outside Karachi.16 Within its perimeter walls, the satellite image shows three potential storage bunkers linked by looping roads.17 The fact that this image is available online, and that the unusual configuration of the base is clear, argues strongly that knowledge of the location of at least some nuclear weapons storage and other related facilities has reached terrorists in Pakistan. As the number of nuclear weapons facilities grows, and the number of those with access to nuclear weapons or related components rises, the complex challenge of assuring the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons components will become ever more difficult. Terrorist groups have now shown themselves capable of [infiltrating] penetrating even the most securely defended of Pakistan’s military bases and of holding space within those bases for many hours even against the elite SSG, more than enough time with the right equipment and sufficient numbers to carry out terrorist acts with enormous political or destructive pay-off, from video broadcasts with the attention of the world’s media, through potentially destroying by explosions nuclear weapons or materials and the creation of a radiological hazard, to the possibility of the theft of nuclear weapons components or materials for subsequent terrorist use. Indeed, on May 22-23, 2011, only about 15 miles from the suspected nuclear weapons storage facility near Masroor, a major terrorist attack targeted the naval aviation base at PNS Mehran in Karachi. Early reports suggest that between six and ten terrorists stormed the high security base from several entry points, that they had knowledge of the location of intruder detection cameras that they were able to bypass, and that they penetrated deep inside the base before using rocket-propelled grenades, explosives and small-arms to destroy several aircraft and take hostages. It took the base security and additional Pakistan Army rangers and commandos more than 18 hours to end the siege. At least 13 people were killed. A frontal assault of this kind on nuclear weapons storage facilities, which are the most robustly defended elements of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons cycle, is no longer an implausible event. The successful location and penetration of such a site by terrorists, even if they were ultimately unsuccessful in accessing nuclear assets, would itself be a transformative event both in terms of the U.S.-Pakistani nuclear relationship and in terms of international anxiety about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Such an assault would also critically undermine Pakistan’s reassurances about the security of nuclear weapons elsewhere in the weapons cycle, particularly in transit. As the number of Pakistani nuclear weapons inexorably continues to rise, and as the nuclear weapons security challenges thereby steadily multiply, the odds that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons security will eventually be compromised continue to rise.

**P Aff – Pakistan Advantage [6/\_\_]**

#### And it causes Indo-Pak escalation

**Clarke 4-17**-13 [Michael, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at Griffith Asia Institute with a special focus in terrorism, Griffith University, Bachelor of Arts (Honors) in Asian and International Studies, “Pakistan and Nuclear Terrorism: How Real is the Threat?” Comparative Strategy, 32:2, 98-114, online]

A delegative system has been construed as holding the potential to open the door for¶ nuclear terrorism. It is possible to envisage a scenario in which a terrorist organisation¶ would seek to instigate an India-Pakistan crisis in order to compel Islamabad to deploy¶ part of its nuclear arsenal. Given Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear inferiority vis-a-vis `¶ India, Islamabad maintains a nuclear ﬁrst use posture to maintain a credible deterrent.¶ The circumstances in which Pakistan would resort to nuclear ﬁrst use are also ambiguous,¶ with Lieutenant-General Khalid Kidwai, the director-general of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans¶ Division (SDP), stating in 2002 that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if it perceived that¶ India had crossed four major “thresholds”: India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part¶ of its territory (space threshold); India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces¶ (military threshold); India proceeds to the economic “strangling” of Pakistan (economic¶ threshold); and India undertakes large-scale internal subversion of Pakistan to destabilize¶ it (domestic threshold).48

#### Indo-Pak war causes global nuclear winter- MAD breaks down

**Hundley ’12** [Tom, senior editor at the Pulitzer Center, MA in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania, former National Endowment for the Humanities journalism fellow at the University of Michigan, was a newspaper journalist for 36 years, including nearly two decades as a foreign correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, “Pakistan and India: Race to the End,” 9-5-12, <http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-battlefield-india-arms-race-energy-cold-war>]

Pakistan, however, seems to have embraced this discarded strategy and is now, in effect, challenging India to a game of nuclear chicken -- which seems to have made India tread carefully. Tellingly, in 2008, when Lashkar terrorists attacked Mumbai, Cold Start was not implemented. These days, Indian officials seem to be backing away from the idea. "There is no Cold Start doctrine. No such thing. It was an off-the-cuff remark from a former chief of staff. I have been defense minister of the country. I should know," veteran Indian politician Jaswant Singh assured me. In a WikiLeaked classified document dated Feb. 16, 2010, Tim Roemer, then U.S. ambassador to India, described Cold Start as "a mixture of myth and reality" that, if implemented, "would likely encounter very mixed results."¶ Pakistani military planners, however, continue to be obsessed with the idea of Cold Start. It comes up in every conversation about security, and it is the driving force behind the country's program to develop tactical battlefield nukes. For now, the focus is on missile delivery systems, but according to Maria Sultan, director of the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, an Islamabad think tank, there is growing interest in using nukes in other ways -- such as to create an electromagnetic pulse that would fry the enemy's electronics. "In short, we will look for full-spectrum response options," she said.¶ The arms race could make a loose nuke more likely. After all, Pakistan's assurances that its nuclear arsenal is safe and secure rest heavily on the argument that its warheads and their delivery systems have been uncoupled and stored separately in heavily guarded facilities. It would be very difficult for a group of mutinous officers to assemble the necessary protocols for a launch and well nigh impossible for a band of terrorists to do so. But that calculus changes with the deployment of mobile battlefield weapons. The weapons themselves, no longer stored in heavily guarded bunkers, would be far more exposed.¶ Nevertheless, military analysts from both countries still say that a nuclear exchange triggered by miscalculation, miscommunication, or panic is far more likely than terrorists stealing a weapon -- and, significantly, that the odds of such an exchange increase with the deployment of battlefield nukes. As these ready-to-use weapons are maneuvered closer to enemy lines, the chain of command and control would be stretched and more authority necessarily delegated to field officers. And, if they have weapons designed to repel a conventional attack, there is obviously a reasonable chance they will use them for that purpose. "It lowers the threshold," said Hoodbhoy. "The idea that tactical nukes could be used against Indian tanks on Pakistan's territory creates the kind of atmosphere that greatly shortens the distance to apocalypse."¶ Both sides speak of the possibility of a limited nuclear war. But even those who speak in these terms seem to understand that this is fantasy -- that once started, a nuclear exchange would be almost impossible to limit or contain. "The only move that you have control over is your first move; you have no control over the nth move in a nuclear exchange," said Carnegie's Tellis. The first launch would create hysteria; communication lines would break down, and events would rapidly cascade out of control. Some of the world's most densely populated cities could find themselves under nuclear attack, and an estimated 20 million people could die almost immediately.¶ What's more, the resulting firestorms would put 5 million to 7 million metric tons of smoke into the upper atmosphere, according to a new model developed by climate scientists at Rutgers University and the University of Colorado. Within weeks, skies around the world would be permanently overcast, and the condition vividly described by Carl Sagan as "nuclear winter" would be upon us. The darkness would likely last about a decade. The Earth's temperature would drop, agriculture around the globe would collapse, and a billion or more humans who already live on the margins of subsistence could starve.¶ This is the real nuclear threat that is festering in South Asia. It is a threat to all countries, including the United States, not just India and Pakistan. Both sides acknowledge it, but neither seems able to slow their dangerous race to annihilation.

#### The plan is key to effective drone usage-

#### 1) Host Country-

#### Ending drones key to host country cooperation

Streeter ’13 (Devin C. Streeter, Helms School Of Government, Liberty University “Boko Haram, Drone Policy, And Port Security: Issues For Congress”, [http://www.academia.edu/3523639/U.S.\_Drone\_Policy\_Tactical\_Success\_and\_Strategic\_Failure](http://www.academia.edu/3523639/U.S._Drone_Policy_Tactical_Success_and_Strategic_Failure%29shaw), April 19, 2013)

A new set of drone operating procedures would help to repair international relations and decrease civilian casualties. Furthermore, nations like Yemen, Somalia, and others, will not feel threatened and will readily accept U.S. assistance in counterterrorism efforts.¶ 78¶ Cooperation with affected nations will ensure that their sovereignty is not violated¶ 79¶ and the use of human intelligence programs will reduce civilian casualties, thus resulting in a sanitary, more effective drone operation.¶ 80¶ While the U.S. drone program has many noteworthy tactical successes, it simultaneously has suffered various strategic failures. Collateral damage has directly strained our relations with Pakistan, and indirectly stressed our relations with Europe, Asia, and South America. However, by increasing joint cooperation and decreasing civilian casualties, the harms inflicted on international relations can be reconciled. If this new system is implemented, not only will United States policy makers see the radical decrease of innocent deaths, but they will also see a decrease in terrorism and the terrorist recruiting pool.¶ 81¶ Confronting this issue and establishing a new set of standard operating procedures should be on the forefront of every elected official’s agenda, for the purpose of improving foreign policy and repairing international relations.

#### Host country cooperation key

Cordesman ’13 (Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, “The Common Lessons of Benghazi, Algeria, Mali, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Arab Spring”, <http://csis.org/publication/common-lessons-benghazi-algeria-mali-tunisia-egypt-syria-iraq-yemen-afghanistan-pakistan>, January 28, 2013)

Working with Regional and Host Country Partners The third lesson is that in most cases the United States will find that the key partner will not be a European ally but either a regional partner or the host country itself. The internal dynamics of the host country that will determine what real world opportunities exist at what mix of costs and benefits. If the host country lacks the willingness and absorption capability to use U.S. and allied aid, the default setting should be containment not intervention. It is a grim reality that regardless of the humanitarian cost, there is little point in trying to help countries that cannot help themselves and creating a culture of dependence that shifts that responsibility to the United States or some outside power. More broadly, the United States should learn that it needs to work through local governments on their terms and rely on local allies that share a common religion and value system with the host or target country. This is particularly true because much of the reason for the rebirth of religious values throughout the Islamic world has come from the failure of secular governance. U.S. strengths consist of helping nations and nonstate actors deal with secular problems and needs, but the United States will always face major obstacles when it comes to dealing with Islam and different cultural values. This is why allies like the southern Gulf states, Arab states, Turkey and other states with largely Islamic populations will be key partners at both the regional and national level. They can act in ways the United States and other outside powers cannot. They do not bring the burden of western secularism, ties to Israel, or the history of European colonialism to a given problem. They also do not bring the baggage of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan or the war on terrorism. Moreover, such partnerships are necessary because the United States must also work with its regional allies to help them to maintain or achieve their own internal stability and to limit the risk of the political upheavals that are underway in so many states. Patient diplomatic and advisory efforts to help allied and friendly countries make their own reforms in areas like economics and governance will be key sources of stability and evolutionary change. So will assistance in creating effective counterterrorism forces and internal security efforts, as will support to regional security structures like the Gulf Cooperation Council.

#### 2) Targeted strikes key to effective strikes

**Dunn and Wolf ’13** [Dr David Hastings Dunn is Reader in International Politics and Head of ¶ Department in the Department of Political Science and International Studies ¶ at the University of Birmingham, UK, Chairman of the ¶ West Midlands Military Education Committee, winner of the the UK’s Political Studies Association’s ¶ Best Article in the British Journal of Politics and International Relations in ¶ 2009 Prize, and Stefan Wolff, PhD, is Professor of International Security at the University of ¶ Birmingham in the UK, “Drone Use in Counter-Insurgency and CounterTerrorism: Policy or Policy Component?” <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/WHR_2-13_Hitting_the_Target.pdf#page=89>]

The use of drones as weapons has evolved naturally from their use as reconnaissance vehicles. Tasked to gather information on enemy movements, their on-board optics and ability to loiter made them ideal platforms for such a role, providing an unparalleled degree of surveillance over large areas and for long periods of time, generating data that could subsequently inform ground- and air-combat operations. The time gap between gathering and analysing information, and acting on it, however, diminished significantly once drones became armed, enabling a much more immediate response to this operational intelligence. Yet **an important distinction needs to be drawn** here between acting on operational intelligence that corroborates existing intelligence and confirms the presence of a specific pre-determined target and its elimination – so-called ‘targeted strikes’ (or less euphemistically, ‘targeted killings’) – and acting on an algorithmic analysis of operational intelligence alone, determining on the spot whether a development on the ground suggests terrorist activity or association and thus fulfils certain (albeit, to date, publicly not disclosed) criteria for triggering an armed response by the remote pilot of a drone – socalled ‘signature strikes’.6¶ Targeted strikes rely on corroborating pre-existing intelligence: they serve the particular purpose of eliminating specific individuals that are deemed crucial to enemy capabilities and are meant to diminish opponents’ operational, ¶ tactical and strategic capabilities, primarily by killing mid- and top-level leadership cadres. To the extent that evidence is available, it suggests that ¶ targeted strikes are highly effective in achieving these objectives, while ¶ simultaneously generating relatively little blowback, precisely because they target individual (terrorist) leaders and cause few, if any, civilian casualties. ¶ This explains, to a significant degree, why the blowback effect in Yemen – where the overwhelming majority of drone strikes have been targeted strikes ¶ – has been less pronounced than in Pakistan and Afghanistan.7¶ Signature strikes, in contrast, can still be effective in diminishing operational, ¶ tactical and strategic enemy capabilities, but they do so to a certain degree by ¶ chance and also have a much higher probability of causing civilian casualties. ¶ Using drones for signature strikes decreases the dependence on pre-existing ¶ intelligence about particular leaders and their movements and more fully ¶ utilises their potential to carry out effective surveillance and respond to ¶ the conclusions drawn from it immediately. Signature strikes have been the ¶ predominant approach to drone usage in Pakistan and Afghanistan.8¶ Such strikes have had the effect of decimating the rank and file of the Taliban and their associates – but they have also caused large numbers of civilian casualties and, at a minimum, weakened the respective host governments’ ¶ legitimacy and forced them to condemn publicly, and in no uncertain terms, ¶ the infringement of their states’ sovereignty by the US. In turn, this has strained already difficult relations between countries which have more ¶ common than divergent interests when it comes to regional stability and ¶ the fight against international terrorist networks. That signature strikes have ¶ a high probability of going wrong and that such failures prove extremely ¶ counterproductive is also illustrated by a widely reported case from Yemen, ¶ in which twelve civilians were killed in the proximity of a car identified as ¶ belonging to an Al-Qa’ida member.9¶ The kind of persistent and intimidating presence of a drone policy geared ¶ towards signature strikes, and the obvious risks and consequences involved ¶ in repeatedly making wrong decisions, are both **counterproductive** in themselves **and corrosive** of efforts that seek to undercut the local support enjoyed by insurgent and terrorist networks, as well as the mutual assistance ¶ that they can offer each other. Put differently, signature strikes, in contrast ¶ to targeted killings, do anything but help to disentangle the links between ¶ insurgents and terrorists.¶ Counter-insurgency as a strategy works best by providing security on the ¶ ground (deploying soldiers amongst the community that they are intended to ¶ protect) and establishing and sustaining a s ufficiently effective local footprint ¶ of the state and its institutions providing public goods and services beyond ¶ just security (water, food, sanitation, healthcare, education and so forth). ¶ This strategy is often encapsulated in the formula ‘clear, hold, build’,10 and ¶ it needs to go hand-in-hand with pursuing a viable political settlement that ¶ addresses what are the, in many cases, legitimate concerns of those fighting, ¶ and supporting, an insurgency. By living among the communities they seek ¶ to secure, soldiers can win their trust, stem support for the insurgents, and ¶ understand who their enemies are, what their demands and objectives are, ¶ and how best to single out those who represent an irreconcilable threat ¶ to the community. In other words, in a context in which the objective is ¶ to protect innocent civilians, win over reconcilable insurgents and their ¶ supporters, and eliminate those who are irreconcilable, drones can deliver ¶ specific contributions to an overall counter-insurgency policy. Yet this can only happen if drones target individuals for a reason, rather than being used, ¶ and perceived, as a blanket approach against an entire community. It is important to bear in mind, in this context, that the success of ¶ counter-insurgency, in part, lies in the above-mentioned transition from a ¶ predominantly military footprint, with some civilian tasks being performed ¶ by soldiers, to a predominantly civilian footprint that includes a military ¶ component to secure gains made in restoring public services and law and order. This is essential because it counters a similar tactic used by insurgents ¶ and terrorists. In Yemen, for example, territorial gains made by Al-Qa’ida ¶ in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) initially garnered a lot of local public ¶ support precisely because they not only drove government forces out of ¶ areas in southern Yemen, but because they also provided basic services to ¶ communities.¶ Yet, as the imposition of Sharia Law became locally less and less popular, tribal ¶ resistance, targeted drone strikes and a government offensive succeeded in ¶ retaking most of the territory gained by AQAP and holding it in the course ¶ of 2012. At the same time, AQAP operations became much more localised, ¶ not only in the sense that the organisation has not been able to mount any ¶ transnational operations, but also in the sense that it has ceased attacks ¶ on Western interests and targets in Yemen, concentrating its remaining ¶ capabilities on attacks against Yemeni military and security officials.11¶ Data from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the Long War Journal¶ for 2012 puts the number of US drone strikes in Yemen at around forty, with ¶ almost 200 militants and around thirty-five civilians killed. In terms of the ¶ number of strikes and enemy combatants killed, this represents a significant ¶ increase compared to previous years: for the three years prior, less than ¶ half the number of strikes were confirmed, and just over half the number of ¶ militants were reportedly killed, while the number of civilian casualties was ¶ approximately a third higher, albeit with none reported in 2011.12¶ Drones, thus, were part of a broader, and, to date, successful, campaign ¶ against AQAP in Yemen. The challenge for the Yemeni government now is to ¶ make the transition from a military presence that secures and holds these ¶ territories to a more civilian one that builds up services and legitimacy, while ¶ at the same time seeking a political settlement with the southern secessionists ¶ through the nascent process of the UN-mediated National Dialogue. Unless, ¶ and until, that happens, the gains of 2012 are easily reversible. By definition, ¶ preventing a reversal of these gains cannot be accomplished by drones. ¶ Indeed, using unmanned aerial platforms to constantly look for signifiers of ¶ terrorist and insurgent activity is almost the antithesis of counter-insurgency. ¶ Civilian casualties, which have a much higher probability as a result of ¶ signature strikes, alienate and radicalise the local population and only serve ¶ to increase the active and passive support that such communities are likely ¶ to offer both terrorists and insurgents.¶ Once civilian casualties mount, they create an important negative legacy ¶ effect. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, the ¶ average civilian casualty rate from US drone strikes in Yemen since the ¶ inception of the policy there is around 6 per cent, comparable to the 2011 ¶ average for Pakistan, which was 5.5 per cent.13 In the case of Pakistan, this represented a significant decline from the 2008 peak of almost 60 per cent.14¶ Yet even more than four years after a significant decline in civilian casualties, ¶ US drone strikes remain deeply unpopular in the country,15 far more so than ¶ in Yemen.16 As noted earlier, the majority of these strikes in Pakistan were ¶ signature strikes; those in Yemen targeted strikes. While both were effective ¶ in reducing insurgent and terrorist capabilities, their broader consequences ¶ in Pakistan have been more negative both domestically and in terms of USPakistani relations than they were in Yemen.¶ To put it differently, using drones for long periods over isolated communities ¶ is almost an invitation for trouble in a variety of ways, including, crucially, ¶ the fact that the psychological, physical and cultural distance between ¶ the operators and their observed community is likely to contribute to ¶ misinterpretation and misperception, and thus to the killing of innocent ¶ civilians.¶ Remote observation offers none of the experience, associated with traditional ¶ counter-insurgency campaigns, that can generate cultural sensitivity and the ¶ building of trust and empathy. Instead it offers a sanitised form of surveillance ¶ where the act of killing is dehumanised for both the killers and the killed. ¶ Drone strikes of this nature act on suspicions rather than verified intelligence ¶ and their operation offers no sense of feedback to their operators. Their ¶ remoteness is not just physical: the secrecy with which these programmes ¶ operate and the lack of accountability to the communities over which they ¶ operate means that there is neither a legal nor an emotional cost involved in ¶ getting things wrong.¶ Given that drones, if deployed with sensitivity and clear purpose, can make ¶ a significant and useful contribution to counter-insurgency and counterterrorist campaigns as illustrated by the discussion of the case of Yemen, the ¶ key challenge for policy-makers is to avoid getting things wrong, and having ¶ to live with the consequences of doing so, as is the case with Pakistan. Micah ¶ Zenko draws the conclusion that US drone policy needs to be reformed with ¶ a focus away from signature strikes and towards targeted killings of a limited ¶ number of terrorists with transnational capabilities and intent.17 Similarly, ¶ Joshua Foust argues that for drones to be effective, they must be part of a broader strategic framework.18 This is a sensible proposal with which the ¶ authors generally agree as far as such drone strikes are considered in the ¶ context of counter-terrorist efforts aimed at preventing attacks against the ¶ US and its (and more generally Western) interests abroad.¶ Yet, as has been argued, it is difficult to separate (transnational) terrorist ¶ networks from more localised insurgencies in which the former often ¶ successfully embed themselves. To the extent that drone strikes can ¶ disrupt these links, they can strengthen governments’ counter-insurgency efforts and contribute to establishing environments in which insurgents ¶ are accommodated into political and social processes that reduce the ¶ opportunities for terrorist networks to find bases from which they can ¶ operate. Using drones, from that perspective, is less about limiting their ¶ deployment in principle, but about making sure that they are an element ¶ of a broader policy of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency – not a ¶ substitute for it.¶ the number of strikes and begin a process of taking drones out of the hands of the CIA.

### Allied Backlash

#### Backlash to drone strikes is undermining international credibility and makes drone strikes ineffective

**Zenko ’13** (Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council Special Report No. 65, Online, 2013)

In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: “Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. Even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”63 Under President Obama drone strikes have expanded and intensified, and they will remain a central component of U.S. counterterrorism operations for at least another decade, according to U.S. officials.64 But much as the Bush administration was compelled to reform its controversial counterterrorism practices, it is likely that the United States will ultimately be forced by domestic and international pressure to scale back its drone strike policies. The Obama administration can preempt this pressure by clearly articulating that the rules that govern its drone strikes, like all uses of military force, are based in the laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law; by engaging with emerging drone powers; and, most important, by matching practice with its stated policy by limiting drone strikes to those individuals it claims are being targeted (which would reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties since the total number of strikes would significantly decrease). The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms by design or drone policy reforms by default. Recent history demonstrates that domestic political pressure could severely limit drone strikes in ways that the CIA or JSOC have not anticipated. In support of its counterterrorism strategy, the Bush administration engaged in the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to third countries, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and warrantless wiretapping. Although the Bush administration defended its policies as critical to protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks, unprecedented domestic political pressure led to significant reforms or termination. Compared to Bush-era counterterrorism policies, drone strikes are vulnerable to similar—albeit still largely untapped—moral outrage, and they are even more susceptible to political constraints because they occur in plain sight. Indeed, a negative trend in U.S. public opinion on drones is already apparent. Between February and June 2012, U.S. support for drone strikes against suspected terrorists fell from 83 percent to 62 percent—which represents less U.S. support than enhanced interrogation techniques maintained in the mid-2000s.65 Finally, U.S. drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies, emerging powers, and the local populations in states where strikes occur.66 States polled reveal overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent), Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan (83 percent).67 This is significant because the United States cannot conduct drone strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself. Drone strikes require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors. If such states decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone strikes, their effectiveness would be immediately and sharply reduced, and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is not hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its U.S. military presence after public revelations that U.S. AC-130 gunships were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forcing the United States to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States could attempt to lessen the need for tacit host-state support by making significant investments in armed drones that can be flown off U.S. Navy ships, conducting electronic warfare or missile attacks on air defenses, allowing downed drones to not be recovered and potentially transferred to China or Russia, and losing access to the human intelligence networks on the ground that are critical for identifying targets. According to U.S. diplomats and military officials, active resistance— such as the Pakistani army shooting down U.S. armed drones— is a legitimate concern. In this case, the United States would need to either end drone sorties or escalate U.S. military involvement by attacking Pakistani radar and antiaircraft sites, thus increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.68 Beyond where drone strikes currently take place, political pressure could severely limit options for new U.S. drone bases. For example, the Obama administration is debating deploying armed drones to attack al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa, which would likely require access to a new airbase in the region. To some extent, anger at U.S. sovereignty violations is an inevitable and necessary trade-off when conducting drone strikes. Nevertheless, in each of these cases, domestic anger would partially or fully abate if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below. The United States will inevitably improve and enhance the lethal capabilities of its drones. Although many of its plans are classified, the U.S. military has nonspecific objectives to replace the Predators and Reapers with the Next-Generation Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) sometime in the early-to-mid 2020s. Though they are only in the early stages of development, the next generation of armed drones will almost certainly have more missiles of varying types, enhanced guidance and navigation systems, greater durability in the face of hostile air defense environments, and increased maximum loiter time—and even the capability to be refueled in the air by unmanned tankers.69 Currently, a senior official from the lead executive authority approves U.S. drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings. Several U.S. military and civilian officials claim that there are no plans to develop autonomous drones that can use lethal force. Nevertheless, armed drones will incrementally integrate varying degrees of operational autonomy to overcome their most limiting and costly factor—the human being.70 Beyond the United States, drones are proliferating even as they are becoming increasingly sophisticated, lethal, stealthy, resilient, and autonomous. At least a dozen other states and nonstate actors could possess armed drones within the next ten years and leverage the technology in unforeseen and harmful ways. It is the stated position of the Obama administration that its strategy toward drones will be emulated by other states and nonstate actors. In an interview, President Obama revealed, “I think creating a legal structure, processes, with oversight checks on how we use unmanned weapons is going to be a challenge for me and for my successors for some time to come—partly because technology may evolve fairly rapidly for other countries as well.”71 History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used them in the past. Furthermore, norms can deter states from acquiring new technologies.72 Norms—sometimes but not always codified as legal regimes—have dissuaded states from deploying blinding lasers and landmines, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. A well-articulated and internationally supported normative framework, bolstered by a strong U.S. example, can shape armed drone proliferation and employment in the coming decades. Such norms would not hinder U.S. freedom of action; rather, they would internationalize already-necessary domestic policy reforms and, of course, they would be acceptable only insofar as the limitations placed reciprocally on U.S. drones furthered U.S. objectives. And even if hostile states do not accept norms regulating drone use, the existence of an international normative framework, and U.S. compliance with that framework, would preserve Washington’s ability to apply diplomatic pressure. Models for developing such a framework would be based in existing international laws that emphasize the principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinction—to which the United States claims to adhere for its drone strikes—and should be informed by comparable efforts in the realms of cyber and space. In short, a world characterized by the proliferation of armed drones—used with little transparency or constraint—would undermine core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict, promoting human rights, and strengthening international legal regimes. It would be a world in which targeted killings occur with impunity against anyone deemed an “enemy” by states or nonstate actors, without accountability for legal justification, civilian casualties, and proportionality. Perhaps more troubling, it would be a world where such lethal force no longer heeds the borders of sovereign states. Because of drones’ inherent advantages over other weapons platforms, states and nonstate actors would be much more likely to use lethal force against the United States and its allies.

#### Drone usage causes specifically *allied* backlash that undermines hegemony

Streeter ‘13 (Devin C, Director of Activities, Public Relations, and Recruitment at Liberty University Strategic Intelligence Society, “US Drone Policy: Tactical Success and Strategic Failure,” [http://www.academia.edu/3523639/U.S.\_Drone\_Policy\_Tactical\_Success\_and\_Strategic\_Failure, April 19](http://www.academia.edu/3523639/U.S._Drone_Policy_Tactical_Success_and_Strategic_Failure%2C%20April%2019), 2013)

The first category of nations, while not targeted by drone strikes, is intimidated by their capabilities. India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and over 40 other nations have announced intentions to acquire drones. 27 The main producers of unmanned aerial vehicles are the United States, Israel, and China. 28 The United States, while the leader in drone use and production 29 , must deal with “American export controls.” 30 Israel, however, has fewer restrictions, considering China’s acquisition of drone technology by buying an “anti-radar attack drone” 31 from the small nation. China in turn has offered to sell lower grade drones to the international community. 32 It is unlikely that drone technology will go unshared for long. 33 In essence, the United States has sparked a miniature arms race and has intimidated nations with the threat of a new, superior technology. Governments that have begun pursuing their own UAV programs have shown a notable bitterness to the United States for its unchecked use of drones. 34 Nations such as China, Japan, Russia, and Brazil all disapprove of United States drone policies by over 30 percentage points. 35 To them, the United States seems heavy handed and brutish; holding back technology while indiscriminately using it against our enemies. The lack of consideration and cooperation is a negative influence on world leaders. At the same time, other nations feel that drones violate their airspace and are used without approval from the international community. 36 The majority of these nations fall within the boundaries of the European Union, and while their disapproval is not as notable as the first group, it often reaches the double digits rate. 37 Germany, Great Britain, Poland, and other European Union members do not understand the ‘fire from the hip’ mentality of drone strikes. 38 The European Council on Foreign Relations noted “it [United States] seems to interpret the concept of imminence in a rather more permissive way than most Europeans would be comfortable with.” 39 The European Union fully supports drones in combat support and reconnaissance roles, but has issues with the concept of targeted killings, which often result in collateral damage. 40 European leaders desire an international consensus on how drones should be operated, before more civilians become casualties. 41 The European Council on Foreign Relations further notes: The Obama administration has so far chosen to operate by analogy with inter-state war, but in an era marked by the individualization of conflict, this seems like an outdated approach. 42 Europe does not share the mentality of drone strikes with "acceptable" collateral damage and apolicy that is not accountable to the international community. As a result, relations with Europe have reached a critical point. 43 European nations, alienated by the Obama administration’s progressive dialogue but aggressive drone policy, 44 are ready to try and take the lead in international relations. 45 Germany in particular will be a key nation as it increases in prominence among European states. 46 Hans Kundnani, a well-known journalist and political pundit, notes, “Obama is extremely popular in Germany, but Berlin’s deeply-held views on the use of military force… have the potential to create a Europe-America split.” 47 Kundnani also states, “A ‘special relationship’ is developing between China and Germany.” 48 Because of anti-drone sentiment, long-time U.S. allies grow increasingly distant, to the point of forming new relationships with China. This is a direct threat to the United States’ place in international relations and a direct challenge to its hegemony. If the relations with Europe are to be fixed, a change in drone protocol is needed.

#### Alliance backlash undermines an effective US hegemonic strategy which prevents global instability

Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, John Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, Lean Forward, EBSCO, Jan/Feb 2013)

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

#### Congress is key to that signal

Ellison ’13 (Keith Ellison, “Time for Congress to build a better drone policy”, <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-13/opinions/36311903_1_drone-strikes-drone-program-drone-policy>, January 13, 2013)

An unmanned U.S. aerial vehicle — or drone — reportedly killed eight people in rural Pakistan last week, bringing the estimated death toll from drone strikes in Pakistan this year to 35. As the frequency of drone strikes spikes again, some questions must be asked: How many of those targeted were terrorists? Were any children harmed? And what is the standard of evidence to carry out these attacks? The United States has to provide answers, and Congress has a critical role to play. The heart of the problem is that our technological capability has far surpassed our policy. As things stand, the executive branch exercises unilateral authority over drone strikes against terrorists abroad. In some cases, President Obama approves each strike himself through “kill lists.” While the president should be commended for creating explicit rules for the use of drones, unilateral kill lists are unseemly and fraught with hazards. When asked about the drone program in October during an interview on the “The Daily Show,” the president said, “One of the things we’ve got to do is put a legal architecture in place, and we need congressional help in order to do that, to make sure that not only am I reined in, but any president’s reined in terms of some of the decisions that we’re making.” It’s time to put words into action. Weaponized drones have produced results. They have eliminated 22 of al-Qaeda’s top 30 leaders and just last week took out a Taliban leader. Critically, they lessen the need to send our troops into harm’s way, reducing the number of U.S. casualties. Yet the costs of drone strikes have been ignored or inadequately acknowledged. The number of innocent civilian casualties may be greater than people realize. A recent study by human rights experts at Stanford Law School and the New York University School of Law found that the number of innocent civilians killed by U.S. drone strikes is much higher than what the U.S. government has reported: approximately 700 since 2004, including almost 200 children. This is unacceptable. Another cost is how drone strikes are shaping views of the United States around the world. You might develop a negative attitude toward the United States if your only perception of it is a foreign aircraft buzzing over your house that occasionally fires missiles into your neighborhood. In Pakistan, where 95 percent of U.S. drone strikes have occurred, people familiar with them overwhelmingly express disapproval (97 percent, according to Pew polling from June) and believe they kill too many innocent people (94 percent). Drone strikes may well contribute to the extremism and terrorism the United States seeks to deter. U.S. drone use has also lowered the threshold for the use of lethal force in foreign countries. Would we fire so many missiles into Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia if doing so required sending U.S. troops into harm’s way? Our drone policy must be guided by more than capability. It must be guided by respect for noncombatants, necessity and urgency. It is Congress’s responsibility to exercise oversight and craft policies that govern the use of lethal force. But lawmakers have yet to hold a single hearing examining U.S. drone policy. Any rules must provide adequate transparency, respect the rule of law, conform with international standards and prudently advance U.S. national security over the long term. In codifying a legal framework to guide executive action on drone strikes, Congress should consider these steps: First, we must do more to avoid innocent civilian casualties. The Geneva Conventions, which have governed the rules of war since World War II, distinguish between combatants and noncombatants in the conduct of hostilities and state that civilian casualties are not acceptable except in cases of demonstrated military necessity. This is the standard we must follow. Second, Congress must require an independent judicial review of any executive-branch “kill list.” The U.S. legal system is based on the principle that one branch of government should not have absolute authority. Congress should object to that concentration of power, especially when it may be used against U.S. citizens. A process of judicial review would diffuse executive power and provide a mechanism for greater oversight. Third, the United States must collaborate with the international community to develop a widely accepted set of legal standards. No country — not even our allies — accepts the U.S. legal justification for targeted killings. Our justification must rest on the concept of self-defense, which would allow the United States to protect itself against any imminent threat. Any broader criteria would create the opportunity for abuse and set a dangerous standard for other countries to follow, which could harm long-term U.S. security interests. The United States will not always enjoy a monopoly on sophisticated drone technology. The Iranian-made drone that Hezbollah recently flew over Israel should compel us to think about the far-reaching implications of current policy. A just, internationally accepted protocol on the use of drones in warfare is needed. By creating and abiding by our own set of reasonable standards, the United States will demonstrate to the world that we believe in the rule of law.

### Solvency

#### Text: The United States Congress should restrict the use of signature strikes by the President of the United States.

#### Plan solves credibility and U.S. drone effectiveness

**Zenko ’13** [Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council Special Report No. 65, online]

In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared:¶ “Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in¶ binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. Even as we confront a¶ vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of¶ America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”63 Under¶ President Obama drone strikes have expanded and intensified, and they¶ will remain a central component of U.S. counterterrorism operations¶ for at least another decade, according to U.S. officials.64 But much as the¶ Bush administration was compelled to reform its controversial counterterrorism¶ practices, it is likely that the United States will ultimately¶ be forced by domestic and international pressure to scale back its drone¶ strike policies. The Obama administration can preempt this pressure¶ by clearly articulating that the rules that govern its drone strikes, like all¶ uses of military force, are based in the laws of armed conflict and international¶ humanitarian law; by engaging with emerging drone powers;¶ and, most important, by matching practice with its stated policy by¶ limiting drone strikes to those individuals it claims are being targeted¶ (which would reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties since the total¶ number of strikes would significantly decrease).¶ The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone¶ use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms¶ by design or drone policy reforms by default. Recent history demonstrates¶ that domestic political pressure could severely limit drone¶ strikes in ways that the CIA or JSOC have not anticipated. In support of¶ its counterterrorism strategy, the Bush administration engaged in the¶ extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to third countries, the use¶ of enhanced interrogation techniques, and warrantless wiretapping.¶ Although the Bush administration defended its policies as critical to¶ protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks, unprecedented¶ domestic political pressure led to significant reforms or termination. Compared to Bush-era counterterrorism policies, drone strikes are¶ vulnerable to similar—albeit still largely untapped—moral outrage,¶ and they are even more susceptible to political constraints because they¶ occur in plain sight. Indeed, a negative trend in U.S. public opinion¶ on drones is already apparent. Between February and June 2012, U.S.¶ support for drone strikes against suspected terrorists fell from 83 percent¶ to 62 percent—which represents less U.S. support than enhanced¶ interrogation techniques maintained in the mid-2000s.65 Finally, U.S.¶ drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies,¶ emerging powers, and the local populations in states where strikes¶ occur.66 States polled reveal overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone¶ strikes: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent),¶ Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan¶ (83 percent).67¶ This is significant because the United States cannot conduct drone¶ strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself. Drone strikes¶ require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors. If such¶ states decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone¶ strikes, their effectiveness would be immediately and sharply reduced,¶ and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is¶ not hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its¶ U.S. military presence after public revelations that U.S. AC-130 gunships¶ were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in¶ late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forcing¶ the United States to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a¶ staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States could¶ attempt to lessen the need for tacit host-state support by making significant¶ investments in armed drones that can be flown off U.S. Navy ships,¶ conducting electronic warfare or missile attacks on air defenses, allowing¶ downed drones to not be recovered and potentially transferred to¶ China or Russia, and losing access to the human intelligence networks¶ on the ground that are critical for identifying targets.¶ According to U.S. diplomats and military officials, active resistance—¶ such as the Pakistani army shooting down U.S. armed drones—¶ is a legitimate concern. In this case, the United States would need to¶ either end drone sorties or escalate U.S. military involvement by attacking¶ Pakistani radar and antiaircraft sites, thus increasing the likelihood¶ of civilian casualties.68 Beyond where drone strikes currently take place,¶ political pressure could severely limit options for new U.S. drone bases. For example, the Obama administration is debating deploying armed¶ drones to attack al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North¶ Africa, which would likely require access to a new airbase in the region.¶ To some extent, anger at U.S. sovereignty violations is an inevitable and¶ necessary trade-off when conducting drone strikes. Nevertheless, in¶ each of these cases, domestic anger would partially or fully abate if the¶ United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.¶ The United States will inevitably improve and enhance the lethal¶ capabilities of its drones. Although many of its plans are classified, the¶ U.S. military has nonspecific objectives to replace the Predators and¶ Reapers with the Next-Generation Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)¶ sometime in the early-to-mid 2020s. Though they are only in the early¶ stages of development, the next generation of armed drones will almost¶ certainly have more missiles of varying types, enhanced guidance and¶ navigation systems, greater durability in the face of hostile air defense¶ environments, and increased maximum loiter time—and even the capability¶ to be refueled in the air by unmanned tankers.69 Currently, a senior¶ official from the lead executive authority approves U.S. drone strikes in¶ nonbattlefield settings. Several U.S. military and civilian officials claim¶ that there are no plans to develop autonomous drones that can use lethal¶ force. Nevertheless, armed drones will incrementally integrate varying¶ degrees of operational autonomy to overcome their most limiting and¶ costly factor—the human being.70¶ Beyond the United States, drones are proliferating even as they are¶ becoming increasingly sophisticated, lethal, stealthy, resilient, and¶ autonomous. At least a dozen other states and nonstate actors could¶ possess armed drones within the next ten years and leverage the technology¶ in unforeseen and harmful ways. It is the stated position of the¶ Obama administration that its strategy toward drones will be emulated by other states and nonstate actors. In an interview, President Obama¶ revealed, “I think creating a legal structure, processes, with oversight¶ checks on how we use unmanned weapons is going to be a challenge for¶ me and for my successors for some time to come—partly because technology¶ may evolve fairly rapidly for other countries as well.”71¶ History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities¶ is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used¶ them in the past. Furthermore, norms can deter states from acquiring new technologies.72 Norms—sometimes but not always codified as¶ legal regimes—have dissuaded states from deploying blinding lasers¶ and landmines, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. A well-articulated and internationally supported normative framework, bolstered by a strong U.S. example, can shape armed drone proliferation¶ and employment in the coming decades. Such norms would not¶ hinder U.S. freedom of action; rather, they would internationalize¶ already-necessary domestic policy reforms and, of course, they would¶ be acceptable only insofar as the limitations placed reciprocally on U.S.¶ drones furthered U.S. objectives. And even if hostile states do not accept¶ norms regulating drone use, the existence of an international normative framework, and U.S. compliance with that framework, would preserve¶ Washington’s ability to apply diplomatic pressure. Models for¶ developing such a framework would be based in existing international¶ laws that emphasize the principles of necessity, proportionality, and¶ distinction—to which the United States claims to adhere for its drone¶ strikes—and should be informed by comparable efforts in the realms of¶ cyber and space.¶ In short, a world characterized by the proliferation of armed¶ drones—used with little transparency or constraint—would undermine¶ core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict, promoting¶ human rights, and strengthening international legal regimes. It would¶ be a world in which targeted killings occur with impunity against anyone¶ deemed an “enemy” by states or nonstate actors, without accountability¶ for legal justification, civilian casualties, and proportionality. Perhaps¶ more troubling, it would be a world where such lethal force no longer¶ heeds the borders of sovereign states. Because of drones’ inherent¶ advantages over other weapons platforms, states and nonstate actors¶ would be much more likely to use lethal force against the United States¶ and its allies.